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SURVEY SECTION
Constitutional Law. Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580 (R.I. 1998).
In the absence of a directive to the contrary, each word in a clause
of the state constitution is deemed to be carefully chosen, thus de-
fining the intention and effect of the constitution's framers. A con-
stitutional provision does not give rise to a cause of action where
the legislature has remained silent and where the enumerated
right, as well as the means for its enjoyment and protection are not
fully defined.
In Bandoni v. State,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court faced
the issue of whether victims were entitled to collect monetary dam-
ages from state officials when the officials failed to notify the vic-
tims of their constitutional rights. 2 The Bandoni court, while not
condoning the failure to notify the victims, declined to allow the
suit for damages under either a theory of common law negligence
or a constitutional violation. 3 Additionally, the court felt the deter-
mination of whether such a remedy was contemplated or allowed
resided with the legislature. 4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Lorraine and Robert Bandoni were injured in a drunk driving
accident in Coventry, R.I. on August 1, 1992.5 While traveling on a
motorcycle the Bandonis were struck by a truck driven by Robert
L. Richardson (Richardson).6 Lorraine Bandoni was thrown from
the motorcycle and suffered minor injuries. Robert Bandoni was
seriously injured in the accident, suffering, among other ailments,
a shattered left leg and pelvis.7 Subsequently, the police arrested
Richardson and charged him with driving while intoxicated.8 On
August 5, 1992, Lorraine Bandoni contacted the Coventry police
regarding the accident investigation. 9 She requested, and was as-
sured, that the Coventry Police Department would notify both her
1. 715 A.2d 580 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 582.
3. See id. at 584.
4. See id. at 582.
5. See id. at 582-83.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 583.
8. See id. A blood test revealed that Richardson's blood-alcohol content was
more than two times the legal limit in Rhode Island. See id.
9. See id.
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and her husband regarding the pending criminal investigation.' 0
However, this was not to be the case.
On August 12, 1992, Richardson was arraigned and formally
charged with driving while intoxicated." The Bandonis were
neither notified of this arraignment nor the subsequent pre-trial
hearing which took place on September 23, 1992.12 At the pre-trial
hearing, Richardson pled nolo contendere to a reduced charge of
"'reckless driving and other offenses against public safety.'"'13 He
was sentenced to one year's unsupervised probation, ordered to
make a $250 contribution to the Victims' of Crime Indemnity
Fund, and payment of court costs. 14 Richardson did not lose his
license for any period of time.15
The Bandonis first learned of the plea bargain while preparing
for a civil lawsuit against Richardson. 16 After learning that their
right to address the court had been disregarded due to the officials'
failure to notify them, the Bandonis filed suit. 17 Their claim
against the town of Coventry, pursuant to Rhode Island General
Laws section 45-15-5,18 alleged that the town officials had failed to
uphold their statutory and constitutional rights. 19 The Bandonis
10. See id.; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-28-4 (1956) (1994 Reenactment) (set-
ting forth the right to address the court prior to sentencing).




15. See id. Rhode Island General Laws sections 31-27-2.6(a) and (c) state:
Driving under the influence of liquor or drugs, resulting in serious bodily
injury--(a) When serious bodily injury of any person other than the opera-
tor is caused by the operation of any motor vehicle, the operator of which
is under the influence of any intoxicating liquor,.., the person so operat-
ing the vehicle shall be guilty of driving under the influence of liquor or
drugs, resulting in serious bodily injury... (c) Any person charged with
the commission of the offense set forth in subsection (a) shall, upon convic-
tion, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year and for not
more than ten (10) years and by a fine of not less than five thousand dol-
lars ($5,000). The sentencing judge shall have the discretion to sentence
the person to any unit of the adult correctional institution. Additionally,
the license of the person may be revoked for a period of up to two (2) years.
Id.
16. See Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 583.
17. See id.
18. See id.; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-15-5 (1956) (1991 Reenactment) (set-
ting forth the method of presentment to the town council of any claim or demand
against any town).
19. See Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 583.
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then filed suit against the town of Coventry, the State of Rhode
Island, and their respective agents under a common law negligence
theory for failure to notify them of the pending criminal action,
thus violating their rights under the Rhode Island Constitution.
The Rhode Island Constitution, Victim's Bill of Rights amend-
ment,20 provides a victim of crime the right to address the court
regarding the effect the defendant's action has had on them before
sentencing. 21 Additionally, the Bandonis alleged numerous viola-
tions of various statutory rights under the Victim's Bill of Rights.22
The Bandonis argued that, had they been notified of the court
dates, they would have been there to object to the plea bargain and
request restitution from Richardson pursuant to Rhode Island
law.23
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, on appeal, was presented
with the issue of whether victims are entitled to collect monetary
damages from state officials when the officials failed to notify the
victims of their constitutional rights.24 The Bandonis asserted
that they should be allowed to present the victim impact statement
they would have presented at trial.26 Furthermore, they argued
that the measure of damages should be based on whatever restitu-
tion the trial judge felt was reasonable. 26
20. R.I. Const. art. I, § 23 (1996).
21. See Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 583.
22. See id. at 583-84. The Bandonis claimed several statutory violations. See
R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-28-3(a)(15) (1956) (1994 Reenactment) (stating that a victim
has the right "[tlo be informed by the prosecuting officer of the right to request that
restitution be an element of the final disposition of a case"); id. § 12-28-4.1(a) (stat-
ing that "the victim of the criminal offense shall, upon request, be afforded the
opportunity to address the court regarding the impact which the defendant's crimi-
nal conduct has had upon the victim" prior to the plea negotiations acceptance); id.
§ 12-28-4.3(a) (stating that "[in all misdemeanor cases heard before the district
court, the victim of the alleged criminal offense shall be afforded the opportunity to
address the court during the pretrial conference,... to explain the impact which
the defendant's criminal conduct has had upon the victim and to comment on the
proposed disposition of the case"); id. § 12-28-5.1 (providing automatic entry of a
civil judgment against the defendant after the court orders defendant to make fi-
nancial restitution to the victim of a crime).
23. See Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 583. See generally R.I. Const. art. I, § 23 (1987)
(stating that crime victims have a right to restitution and a right to appear in court
for pre-sentencing); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-28-3 (1956) (1994 Reenactment) (setting
forth the general rights of crime victims).
24. See Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 582.
25. See id. at 583.
26. See id. The Bandonis suggested staging a "mini-trial" where they could
present their victim's impact statement. See id.
624 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:605
BACKGROUND
Article I, section 23 of the Rhode Island Constitution, entitled
"Rights of Victims of Crime,"27 was enacted to protect victims'
rights when they had been harmed as a result of crime.28 Both the
legislature and the judiciary committee felt that the present statu-
tory rights afforded to victims, as well as the enforcement of those
rights, were severely inadequate. 29 The goal in establishing the
Rights of Crime amendment was to create "greater support" for
victims of crime.30 Enforcement of the statutory and constitutional
rights would be mandatory, but specific conditions would be deter-
mined by the general assembly and the courts.3 1 However, the leg-
islative history did not categorically assign the duty to establish
the precise components (such as remedies) to either the general
assembly or the court.3 2
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held, in a controversial 4-1
ruling, that the Bandonis did not have a private cause of action
against the state or its officials and that, essentially, the Bandonis
were asking the court to create a cause of action by "judicial
27. R.I. Coast. art. I, § 23 (1987):
A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by agents of the
state with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of the crimi-
nal justice process. Such person shall be entitled to receive, from the per-
petrator of the crime, financial compensation for any injury or loss caused
by the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive such other compensation
as the state may provide. Before sentencing, a victim shall have the right
to address the court regarding the impact which the perpetrator's conduct
has had upon the victim.
Id.
28. See Constitution of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations:
Annotated Edition 11 (1988). Article I, section 23 sets forth a provision vesting a
right in the victim to confront their perpetrator in court, describing the conse-
quence their criminal conduct has had upon the victim. Resolution 86-00140 (as it
was formerly called) was originally passed in May 1986. It was then submitted to
the Committee on Style and Drafting in June of 1986. The resolution gained final
approval and was passed with style changes on June 26, 1986. See id.
29. See id. (noting that in order to best protect the rights of victims, all parts
of the criminal justice system must work together). "The judiciary Committee con-
cluded that while the general assembly has addressed the problem of victim rights,
enforcement has been inadequate." Id.
30. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 583.
31. See id. at 583-84.
32. See id. at 584.
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rule."33 The court first addressed the Bandonis' claim of common
law negligence. The Bandonis claimed that the officers failure to
notify them of their rights amounted to a breach of duty which
could be remedied through monetary damages.34 The court re-
viewed the established rule that, when a statute contains unam-
biguous language, the court must interpret the statute literally.35
Additionally, the court noted that statutes are "'subject to strict
construction'" when they' set forth rights that did not exist at com-
mon law.36 The court explained that it was not within their func-
tion to "rewrite or amend statutes" and that the legislature had not
intended for the court to act in such a manner.37 Therefore, the
court concluded that judicial restraint prevented them from find-
ing a cause of action based in negligence since there was no ex-
isting duty at common law to notify victims of their rights, in
addition to the fact that the legislature had failed to provide for
civil liability in situations such as this.38
In considering the Bandonis' claim of a constitutional tort, the
court examined both the plain language and the legislative history
behind the Rights of Victims of Crime amendment to the Rhode
Island Constitution. The court concluded that a cause of action
could not be derived from the amendment itself, due to the fact
that it is overly broad and does not enumerate ways that victim's
rights can be enforced.3 9 In making this determination, the court
analyzed whether article I, section 23 was self-executing.40 The
33. Id.
34. See id. at 583-84.
35. See id. (citing Wayne Distrib. Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human
Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 460 (R.I. 1996)).
36. Id. (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d
1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996)); see also Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 968 (R.I. 1995)
(creating "new causes of action is a legislative function"); In re John, 605 A.2d 486,
488 (R.I. 1992) (advocating the idea of judicial restraint if a statute does not pro-
vide for a private right as a cause of action).
37. See Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 585 (citing Accent Store Design, 674 A.2d at
1226).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 588. The majority asserted that the legislators had modeled the
victim's rights amendment after section 12-28-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws,
which uses broader language than that of section 12-28-3, which establishes spe-
cific provisions. In fact, the only substantial difference between section 12-28-2
and article I, section 23, of the state Constitution is that the amendment is ex-
pressed in mandatory terms. See id.
40. See id. at 586; see also Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900) (holding
that 1a] constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a
1999] 625
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court found that the amendment merely enumerated general prin-
ciples, not a specific right or ways to protect or enforce that right,
thus the amendment was not self-executing. 41 The court ulti-
mately refused to address the issue of whether there exists a cause
of action for damages stemming from the victim's rights amend-
ment, thereby precluding the Bandonis any remedy for the viola-
tion of their rights.
The court firmly believed that the creation of a new cause of
action is a legislative function.42 The majority explained that the
court's function is to interpret the law, not to create new law, and
that the judiciary can only enforce existing rights, not enlarge
them.43 In accordance with this interpretation of the doctrine of
separation of powers, the court refused to grant a remedial mecha-
nism where the legislature had failed to provide one.44 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court affirmed that "once Congress has spoken, a
court cannot override the unambiguous words of an enacted stat-
ute and substitute for them the court's views of what individual
legislators likely intended."46
Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Flanders asserted that victims possess a
fundamental right under the Rhode Island Constitution. There-
fore, the majority's failure to recognize this right, simply because
the legislature had not given it's explicit authority, is "very troub-
ling."46 The dissent argued that the framer's intent is clear: to al-
low victims legal recourse; and furthermore, this court was not
required to look to the General Assembly to expressly provide for a
sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or
the duty imposed may be enforced") (emphasis added); Shields v. Gerhart, 658 A.2d
924, 928 (Vt. 1995) (holding that self-executing provisions do not contain legisla-
tive directives, and stating that "a decisions for or against self-execution must har-
monize with the scheme of rights established in the constitution as a whole").
41. See Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 587-88.
42. See id. at 584 (quoting Accent Store Design, 674 A.2d at 1226; Ferreira,
652 A.2d at 968).
43. See id. at 584, 596.
44. See id. at 596.
45. Id. at 593 (quoting State v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 699-
700 (1st Cir. 1994)).
46. Id. at 601 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
SURVEY SECTION
private right of action.47 The dissent further advanced the theory
that specific rights, enumerated in the constitution, such as those
in the Victim's Bill of Rights, should be judicially enforced, absent
an "express textual negation" within the body. This includes creat-
ing a remedy for a violation of these rights.'8 Arguing that article
I, section 23 is self-executing, Justice Flanders stated that the fun-
damental right of a victim the be awarded a remedy was com-
pletely expounded in the Victim's Bill of Rights. 49 The dissent
further asserted that the drafters intent was to afford victims a
greater opportunity for protection and enforcement of their rights;
thus, no further legislative directive was necessary.50
The dissent noted that inaction by the legislature cannot be
the sole basis for refusing to uphold a constitutionally enumerated
right.51 The foundation for this assertion was that framers do not
normally state specific enforceable rights, either as private rights
of action or as remedies, that should be provided while in the pro-
cess of drafting constitutional amendments.5 2 The dissent rea-
soned that absent a mandate to the contrary, the court is not
barred from enforcing fundamental constitutional rights by fash-
ioning appropriate remedies. 53 Ultimately, the dissent concluded,
the judiciary has the power to enforce violations of constitutional
rights by creating equitable remedies without legislative
directives.54
CONCLUSION
Guided by the principles of judicial restraint, the Bandoni
court held that article I, section 23 is not self-executing; thus, a
cause of action for damages would not be sustained other than in
extreme circumstances. The court concluded that, in this instance,
the creation of a cause of action for a violation of victim's rights
properly resided with the legislative branch of government. Thus,
47. See id. at 601 n.21 (asserting that this contention is bolstered by the Legis-
lative History pertaining to article I, section 23, which stated the drafter's intent
as providing victim's with an action at law when their rights are violated).
48. See id. at 602.
49. See id. at 626.
50. See id. at 623.
51. See id. at 604.
52. See id. (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979)).
53. See id.
54. See id. at 603.
1999] 627
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it is the legislature's, not the supreme court's, duty to expand on




Constitutional Law. Brousseau v. Town of Westerly, 11 F.
Supp.2d 177 (R.I. 1998). A limited, minimally intrusive body
search of students conducted by school officials is constitutionally
permissible when the circumstances dictate the reasonableness of
the search, and the search conducted is the most efficient response
to the situation.
In Brousseau v. Town of Westerly,' the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island was confronted with the is-
sue of whether a warrantless search of a minor student in a public
school was a violation of both state and federal constitutions and
the state statutory right to privacy. In granting the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the District Court held that (1) the
student had a legitimate expectation of privacy that she would not
be searched;2 (2) the search conducted was minimally intrusive;3
(3) the state interest in protecting students was compelling;4 (4)
the method of search conducted was the most effective in light of
the situation giving rise to the necessity of a search;5 and (5) the
search was reasonable under the circumstances. 6
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On January 10, 1996, Sarah Brousseau attended lunch in the
cafeteria of the Babcock Middle School in Westerly, Rhode Island.7
Cafeteria workers had prepared pizza for lunch on that day, and
sometime during the day a cafeteria worker discovered that a large
knife used for cutting pizzas, approximately 131h inches long, was
missing.8 Assistant principal John Carson was notified of the situ-
ation and, with the assistance of several staff members, began a
search for the missing knife.9 Finding nothing, the assistant prin-
cipal urged any student with any information regarding the knife's
location to come forward.10 No student did so, and school principal
1. 11 F. Supp.2d 177 (D.R.I. 1998).
2. See id. at 181.
3. See id. at 182.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 183.
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Joy Sacco authorized Carson to conduct a pat-down search of all
students present in the cafeteria." The students were separated
into lines by sex, with Carson and another male teacher searching
male students. 12 The female students, including Sarah Brousseau,
were patted down by two female school employees. 13 Each student
was patted in the front and back pocket areas, as well as the an-
kles for possible concealment of the missing knife.' 4 Despite the
search effort, the knife was not produced.15 It was found later in
an empty pizza box in a dumpster behind the school cafeteria.' 6
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff claimed that the school officials' search of her person
was in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
under the U.S. Constitution, 17 the Rhode Island Constitution'-
and Rhode Island statutory law.' 9 According to the district court,
"Itihe threshold question with respect to all of these claims is
whether the search was unreasonable."20 In order to determine
what is an unreasonable search, the court relied upon the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. 21
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Is-
land found that the Fourth Amendment, which provides protection
against any unreasonable searches, is applicable to student
searches by public school officials. 22 The expectation of privacy for
students in a school setting, however, is in some respects "a lesser








18. See id. (stating that Article 1, section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution
prohibits unreasonable searches).
19. See id. (stating that Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-28(a)(1) pro-
hibits unreasonable intrusions of an individuals privacy).
20. Id.
21. See id. at 180-81.
22. See id. at 180 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985)).
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ally."23 Accordingly, the court must examine the context in which
the necessity for a search arises and "balanctel the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails" in assessing the
"reasonableness" of a search. 24 As a starting point, the court must
consider "whether the ... action was justified at its inception," and
whether the search was "reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the interference in the first place."25
Although a student generally has a lesser expectation of pri-
vacy, a school official cannot conduct a search without adequate
justification. 26 In the case at bar, Sarah clearly had a legitimate
expectation that she would not be subject to a search that included
the unwanted and unjustified touching of her body.27 However,
that expectation does not necessarily render a search unreasona-
ble; the school official's search in Sarah's case was limited in both
method and scope.28 The court concluded that the search, a brief
"pat-down" that lasted for only a few seconds, was reasonable be-
cause there was minimal intrusion on her privacy, and the purpose
of the search was achieved in the least intrusive manner.29
In this case, the safety and welfare of the student body was
threatened. Thus, the urgency and importance of the officials' in-
terest in searching students was justified by the dangerous nature
of the item that was the focus of the search.30 A large knife in the
possession of a young child presented the possibility of a serious
accident and/or injury. Under the circumstances, it was certainly
reasonable for the school officials' to respond to this grave concern
23. Id. at 181 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657
(1995)).
24. Id. at 180 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37
(1967)).
25. Id. at 181 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 20 (1968))). The United States Supreme Court set forth four factors to be con-
sidered when determining the reasonableness of a search as:
"1. The nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes.
2. The character of the intrusion.
3. The nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue.
4. The efficacy of the means employed in meeting that concern."
Id. (quoting Veronia, 515 U.S. at 654-60).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 181-82.
29. See id. at 182.
30. See id.
1999]
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by administering a limited bodily search of the students.31 More-
over, the officials' use of the search was the most effective means to
directly address the situation, especially after no student volunta-
rily complied with a request to provide information about the
whereabouts of the knife.3 2 The court noted that the plaintiff did
not suggest any possible alternative means that may have been
equally efficacious, if not more, in addressing that concern.33
Therefore, for the purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the
search conducted by the school officials was reasonable under the
circumstances. 34
The court next turned to plaintiff's claims under the Rhode Is-
land Constitution and Rhode Island statutory law.35 The district
court found that the Rhode Island Constitution is "co-extensive
with the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution."36
The court concluded that, like its federal counterpart, the state
constitution prohibits only unreasonable searches.3 7 Thus, since
the search conducted by the school officials was not unreasonable,
plaintiff's claim based upon her rights under the state constitution
must also fail.38 Likewise, Rhode Island's statute only protects
from unreasonable invasions of privacy.3 9 Even though the Rhode
Island Supreme Court has never interpreted General Laws section
9-1-28.1(a)(1), the district court concluded that "it is difficult to be-
lieve that the Rhode Island General Assembly intended to impose
liability for constitutionally permissible searches by governmental
officials." 40 Thus, plaintiffs claim for damages pursuant to Rhode
Island's invasion of privacy statute also failed.41
CONCLUSION
In Brousseau v. Town of Westerly, the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island concluded that, when con-
31. See id.
32. See id. at 183.
33. See id. at 182.
34. See id. at 183.
35. See id.
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ducting searches of students, so long as school officials act reason-
ably and appropriately under the circumstances, the searches will
be in violation of the federal constitution or Rhode Island state
law. Thus, the minimally intrusive pat-down search conducted by
the Westerly school officials searching for a missing pizza knife,
was sufficiently limited and reasonable under the circumstances.
Christopher H. Lordan
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Constitutional Law. Casey v. Newport School Committee, 13 F.
Supp.2d 242 (D.R.I. 1998). When a student is removed from a high
school class for disciplinary reasons, his due process rights are not
violated where a formal grievance procedure existed and when no
evidence is presented to demonstrate the violation of a protected
right.
In Casey v. Newport School Committee,' the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Rhode Island held that although a
high school student was legally entitled to a public education
under state law, that right did not confer entitlement to particular
aspects of the educational program, especially when the student
was assigned to an alternative program for disciplinary reasons.2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Lochiel MacDonald (MacDonald), attended Rog-
ers High School in Newport, Rhode Island as a freshman during
the 1995-96 academic year.3 During the course of the school year,
MacDonald's numerous instances of unruly behavior in the class-
room resulted in disciplinary action.4 On one such occasion, he
threatened his science teacher, Dale Hennessey.5 Accordingly,
Hennessey relayed a report of the incident to the dean of students,
who in turn reported the incident to the police.6 The Newport po-
lice conducted an investigation but ultimately no charges were
filed due to a lack of evidence to prosecute.7
Although no criminal charges were brought, school officials de-
cided to expel MacDonald from Hennessey's class for the remain-
der of the academic year.8 He was given individual instruction by
another science teacher for that period. Despite such instruction,
MacDonald continued the same poor academic performance as he
had prior to removal, and he eventually failed the course. 9
1. 13 F. Supp.2d 242 (D.R.L 1998).
2. See id. at 246.








MacDonald brought claims for alleged violations of his due
process rights against Hennessey, the City of Newport and the
Newport School Committee. Included in the seven counts were al-
leged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, with
additional claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, ma-
licious prosecution and negligent supervision.' 0 The defendants
moved for summary judgment on all counts.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In his complaint, MacDonald asserted federal claims of proce-
dural due process violations under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.11 First,
MacDonald leveled claims against the City of Newport and the
Newport School Committee on a theory of municipal liability. 12
The district court began by turning to Monell v. Department of So-
cial Services of New York, 13 the landmark United States Supreme
Court case in this area of law. 14 In that case, it was held that a
municipality can be held liable for the acts of an agent or employee
"only if the constitutional violation at issue results from a policy,
ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted" by either the
municipality's officers or from an established custom or practice of
the municipality.' 5
Applying Monell to the case at bar, the district court concluded
that no evidence existed to support the notion that MacDonald's
removal from class was the result of any custom or policy of either
the City of Newport or the Newport School Committee.16 Further-
more, the complaint made no allegation that Hennessey, or any
other individual, was acting on authority granted by either body. 17
Nor did MacDonald demonstrate in any way how the actions al-
leged in his complaint were the result of a custom or practice.' 8
Finally, the school committee was found to be an improper party in
10. See id.
11. See id. at 245.
12. See id.
13. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
14. See Casey, 13 F. Supp.2d at 245.
15. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
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this case, as it is a department of the municipality.19 Therefore,
only the municipality itself would be the appropriate party.
MacDonald's due process claim necessarily depended on the
establishment that he had been deprived of a constitutionally rec-
ognized liberty or property interest. To do so, he needed to demon-
strate a "legitimate claim of entitlement"20 to the interest at
issue. 21 In this case, MacDonald claimed that his right to a public
education was thwarted by his removal from class. Although the
court conceded that he did have a legitimate right to a public edu-
cation,22 MacDonald was not deprived merely because he was re-
moved from class; he was placed in an alternative program so as to
continue his education.23 Thus MacDonald's right to a public edu-
cation was not violated because the right does not encompass an
entitlement to specific aspects of educational programs. 24 Addi-
tionally, MacDonald's removal was only for five weeks. Therefore,
the court concluded, his claim falls short of "total exclusion from
the educational process for more than a trivial period."25
MacDonald also claimed that his liberty interest in preserving
his good reputation was damaged by Hennessey's allegedly false
report.26 While recognizing that defamation is actionable in tort,
the court cited the Supreme Court decision of Siegert v. Gilley,27
which established the idea that there is no constitutionally pro-
tected interest in reputation alone. The court also noted that even
if such an interest were constitutionally protected, MacDonald
showed no indication that he had suffered the requisite level of
harm to properly seek a remedy at law for that claim. 28
19. See id.
20. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
21. See Casey, 13 F. Supp.2d at 245-46.
22. See, e.g., Exeter-West Greenwich Regional Sch. Dist. v. Exeter-West
Greenwich Teachers Assoc., 489 A.2d 1010, 1016 (R.I. 1985) (stating that when
state law extends the right to an education to a general class, the state may not
withdraw that right absent fundamentally fair procedures); see also Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975) (stating that "[tihe right to an education in Rhode
Island is recognized and guaranteed in article XII, section 1, of the Rhode Island
Constitution").
23. See Casey, 13 F. Supp.2d at 246.
24. See Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 1001 (D.Me. 1982).
25. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
26. See Casey, 13 F. Supp.2d at 246.
27. 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991).
28. See Casey, 13 F. Supp.2d at 246.
SURVEY SECTION
Despite plaintiff's claim to the contrary, he was entitled to pro-
cedural due process through the high school grievance procedure. 29
Under that policy, a student may contest any disciplinary action
taken against them. MacDonald did so, and exercised the entire
appeals process built into the policy.30 The procedure was found to
have satisfied due process requirements. 3 '
As to the state law claims, the court applied the general rule
articulated by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs.3 2 In Gibbs, the Supreme Court determined that:
[needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a
matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties,
by procurring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable
law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before
trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense,
the state claims should be dismissed as well.33
Therefore, since the plaintiffs federal claim failed, the state claims
should be dismissed as well.3 4
CONCLUSION
Any due process claims MacDonald sought to pursue were in-
valid because, under the given circumstances, no constitutionally
protected property or liberty interest existed. Therefore, defend-
ants violated no constitutional right, and the court granted defend-





32. 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
33. Casey, 13 F. Supp.2d at 247 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726).
34. See id.
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